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,¶PKHUHQRZEXW,ZRQ¶WEHKHUHZKHQ\RXJHWWKLVPHVVDJH 
Niall CONNOLLY+ 
 
ABSTRACT 
$QVZHULQJPDFKLQHPHVVDJHVDOOHJHGO\UHIXWH.DSODQ¶VµFODVVLFDODFFRXQW¶RIWKHVHPDQWLFVRIµ,¶µKHUH¶
DQGµQRZ¶7KHFODVVLFDODFFRXQWGRHVQ¶WDOORZWKDWDWRNHQRIµ,DPQRWKHUHQRZ¶FDQEHWUXHEXWWKHVH
words in an answering machine message can communicate something true.  In this paper I argue that the 
true content communicated by an answering machine message is extra-semantic content conveyed via the 
PHFKDQLVPRIµH[WHUQDOO\Rriented make-EHOLHYH¶.  An answering machine message is associated with a 
game of make-believe whose rules prescribe making believe that the agent who recorded the message is 
speaking there (at the end of the line) and then; and it thereby conveys that the circumstance that would 
make the message fictionally true obtains. 
 
 
 
1. Indexicals, the classical account and the answering machine paradox 
 
It is widely accepted that the µclassical¶ account of the semantics of indexical expressions like µ,¶µKHUH¶
DQGµQRZ¶ - which has its basis in Kaplan 1989 - is refuted by answering machine messages.  Although the 
classical account is acknowledged as the µUHFHLYHG¶ (Cohen 2013, 5) treatment of the semantics of 
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LQGH[LFDOV WKH FRQVHQVXV LQ WKH OLWHUDWXUH JHQHUDWHG E\ WKH µDQVZHULQJ PDFKLQH SDUDGR[¶ LV WKDW LW LV
mistaken as it stands.     
This paper is a defence of the received treatment.  7KHµFODVVLFDODFFRXQW¶GLVFXVVHGLQWKHOLWHUDWXUH
DGDSWV.DSODQ¶VIRUPDOWUHDWPHQWWRQDWXUDOODQJXDJHVDQGWROLQJXLVWLFWRNHQVWKDWFDQSHUVLVWRYHUWLPH
(e.g. written sentences).  It holds that an indexical has a character or linguistic meaning which, in a given 
context, fixes the content/referent of a token of the indexical.  Kaplan defines a context as comprising a 
time, a location, an agent and a world.  The character rules for µ,¶µKHUH¶DQGµQRZ¶VWLSXODWHWKDW tokens of 
µ,¶µKHUH¶DQGµQRZ¶UHIHUUHVSHFWLYHO\ to the agent, location and time of the context.  It is stipulated ± in 
NHHSLQJZLWK WKH µVSHFLDO UHODWLRQVKLS¶ .DSODQEHWZHHQ µ,¶ µKHUH¶DQG µQRZ¶ -  that in any 
µSURSHU¶.DSODQFRQWH[WWKHDJHQWRIDFRQWH[WLVSUHVHQWDWWKHWLPHRIWKHFRQWH[WLQWKHORFDWLRQ
of the context.   
The classical account, in line with this stipulation, takes the context with respect to which a token 
indexical is semantically evaluated to be the µFRQWH[WRISURGXFWLRQ¶RIWKHtoken: the time, location and 
world at which the token is created as the intended vehicle of a semantic content1, and the agent who creates 
it.  And it deems that every token of µ,DPKHUHQRZ¶LVWUXH - µ,DPKHUHQRZ¶LVDµORJLFDOWUXWK¶.DSODQ
1989, 509) - and every token of its negation, (1), is false.   
 
(1) I am not here now. 
 
                                                          
1
 I am elDERUDWLQJKHUHVRPHZKDWRQWKHQRWYHU\FOHDUO\GHILQHGQRWLRQRIµSURGXFWLRQ¶7KHFRQWH[WRISURGXFWLRQLVVRPHWLPHV
glossed as the context of utterance/inscription.  But Dodd & Sweeney (2010) maintain that in the case of answering machines 
messages the utterance LVRQO\FRPSOHWHGZKHQWKHPHVVDJHLVEURDGFDVWDQGRWKHUVHJ&RKHQVSHDNRIµGHIHUUHG
XWWHUDQFHV¶+RZHYHU6WHYHQVDUJXHVDJDLQVWWKHSURSULHW\RIVSHDNLQJRIGHIHUUHGGHOD\HGXWWHUDQFH,WLVDWOeast as 
intuitive, he argues ± and I agree ± to insist that the utterance made by the recorder of an answering machine message is made 
when it is recorded.  At any rate the classical account as I understand it is bound by the constraint on proper contexts.  The 
special relationsKLSEHWZHHQµ,¶µKHUH¶DQGµQRZ¶WKDWUXOHVRXWDWUXHWRNHQRIµ,DPQRWKHUHQRZ¶LVWDNHQWREHSDUWRIWKH
PHDQLQJRIWKHVHWHUPVHYHQWKRXJK.DSODQ¶VIRUPDOLVDWLRQWDNHVWKHHDV\RSWLRQRIUHSUHVHQWLQJLWDVDVHSDUDWHVWLSXODWLRQ 
rather than buildiQJLWLQWRWKHFKDUDFWHUUXOHV0\JORVVRQµSURGXFWLRQ¶DWWHPSWVWRHQVXUHWKDWWKHFRQWH[WRISURGXFWLRQLVD
SURSHUFRQWH[WEXWVKRXOGQ¶WEHWDNHQDVWKHILQDOZRUG 
 3 
+HQFHWKHµDQVZHULQJPDFKLQHSDUDGR[¶«.   If you phone ZKHQ,¶PRXW and you hear a token of (1), what 
is communicated to you is that I am not at the location at which the message is played back at the time the 
message is played back - WKHWLPHLWLVµWRNHQHG¶QRWWKHWLPHLWLVSURGXFHG- and this is true! 
 
      * 
 
The consensus in the literature generated by the answering machine paradox is that the classical 
account is mistaken.2  That is where the consensus ends though.  There is no unanimity on how to amend 
or replace the classical account.     
Suggestions include WKHµLQWHQGHGFRQWH[WYLHZ¶DQGWKHµUHFRJQLVHGFRQWH[WYLHZ¶7KHµLQWHQGHG
FRQWH[WYLHZ¶3UHGHOOLKDVLWWKDWWRNHQLQGH[LFDOVUHIHUWRHOHPHQWVRIWKHcontext of intended 
interpretation: the context with respect to which the agent who utters/inscribes the token intends them to 
EHLQWHUSUHWHG,I,LQWHQGP\XWWHUDQFHRIµ,DPQRWKHUHQRZ¶WREHLQWHUSUHWHGZLWKUHVSHFWWRWKHWLPH
\RXKHDULWWKHQWKDW¶VWKHWLPHP\WRNHQRIµQRZ¶UHIHUVWR%XWDOVRDFFRUGLQJWRWKLVYLHZLI,LQWHQG it 
WREHLQWHUSUHWHGZLWKUHVSHFWWRWKHQWKDW¶VWKHWLPHP\WRNHQRIµQRZ¶UHIHUVWR7KHµUHFRJQLVHG
FRQWH[WYLHZ¶5RPGHQK5RPOXFLVWKDWWRNHQLQGH[LFDOVUHIHUWRHOHPHQWVRIWKHrecognised 
context of interpretation: the context that an ideally informed and attentive audience would recognise as 
WKHFRQWH[WZLWKUHVSHFWWRZKLFKWKH\VKRXOGEHLQWHUSUHWHG0\WRNHQRIµQRZ¶UHIHUVWRDFFRUGLQJ
to this view, if and only if an ideally informed and attentive audience would recognise that it should be 
interpreted with respect to 1971.  
These two views give more power to the mental states of individual speakers and hearers to 
determine semantic content than many would wish to grant to them (Michaelson & Cohen 2013, 587).  I 
direct the reader to further criticisms by Cohen (2013, 14-24) but I will restrict my own critical remarks to 
                                                          
2
 Graham Stevens (2009) is a dissenting voice. But Stevens is criticised by Cohen (2013, footnote 8) for dismissing the conveyed 
content of an answering machine message as extra-semantic without explaining how this content is conveyed. Åkerman (2017) 
outlines a pragmatic framework that could be harnessed by the classical account, but also potentially by rivals. The pragmatic 
story I will tell, in contrast, assumes the correctness of the classical account. 
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targets that DUHFORVHUWRWKHYLHZ,DPGHIHQGLQJDFFRXQWVWKDWFDQFODLPWRµLQKHULWWKHadvantagHV¶&RKHQ
2013, 14) of the received view.  The µFRQWH[WRIWRNHQLQJYLHZ¶ mooted by Sidelle (1991) and defended by 
&RKHQGURSV.DSODQ¶V UHTXLUHPHQWRQ µSURSHU¶ FRQWH[WV DQG WDNHV tokens oI µKHUH¶ DQG µQRZ¶ to refer 
respectively to the location and time they are tokened3, rather than the location and time they are produced.  
In cases of face to face communication the context of production and the context of tokening coincide.  The 
context of tokening view therefore agrees with the classical account on the reference of WRNHQVRIµKHUH¶
DQGµQRZ¶ that occur in face to face communication.  &RKHQFDOOVLWDµFRQVHUYDWLYHH[WHQVLRQ¶ (Cohen 2013, 
14) RI.DSODQ¶VVHPDQWLFV  It is only in cases - like the answering machine case - where the context of 
production and the context of tokening come apart, that the theories disagree over the reference of token 
indexicals.  7KHFRQWH[WRIWRNHQLQJYLHZWDNHVµQRZ¶LQDQVZHULQJPDFKLQHPHVVDJHVWRUHIHUWRWKHWLPH
of tokening ± the time the message is played back ± rather than the time the token is produced by the agent 
who records the message.   
We interpret answering machine messages as concerning the time of tokening, not the time of 
production.  This might be thought to vindicate the small tweak to the classical account urged by Cohen.  
The context of tokening view would be more completely vindicated if whenever the context of production 
and the context of tokening of a token indexical come apart, it is the context of tokening, prima facie, rather 
than the context of production, that is the context with respect to which the token should be interpreted.  
But this is not so.  Cohen GUDZVDWWHQWLRQWR0LFKDHOVRQ¶VREMHFWLRQWKDWWKHWRNHQLQGH[LFDOVLQDQ
inscription - on a postcard - oIµLW¶VEHDXWLIXOKHUHQRZ¶GRQ¶WUHIHUWRWKHWLPHDQGSODFHRIWRNHQLQJEXWWR
the time and place of inscription.   
 
,QUHVSRQVH,SURSRVHWKDWWKH³LQGH[LFDOV´«DUHHLWKHUDQDSKRUDERXQGYDULDEOHVERXQGWR the place/time made 
salient by the picture, place-name, and date on the postcard (cf. the treatment of free indirect discourse occurrences 
                                                          
3
 &RKHQGRHVQ¶WH[SODLQH[DFWO\ZKDWKHPHDQVE\µWRNHQLQJ¶DQG,ZRQ¶WDWWHPSWWRSXWZRUGVLQKLVPRXWK,ZLOORQO\QRWH
that the context of tokening view must XQGHUVWDQGµWRNHQLQJ¶VXFKWKDWWKHORFDWLRQof tokening of an answering machine message 
is the location at which the recording device plays back the message, rather than the location at which the message is heard. 
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in note 21), or demonstratives, for which the postcard itself serves as a completing demonstration. (Cohen 2013, 27 
footnote 32) 
 
 A typical postcard with a picture and postmark can arguably serve either of the roles envisaged by 
&RKHQ¶VSURSRVDO%XWLPDJLQHDWRNHQRI6LQVFULEHGRQSODLQSDSHURUOHIWDVDYRLFHUHFRUGLQJRQVRPH
UHFRUGLQJGHYLFH,¶PWKLQNLQJ- to keep up the 1980s theme - a tape recorder) to be played back when you 
arrive. 
 
(S) ,¶PDERXWWRJRRXWQRZEXW,VKRXOGEHEDFNEHIRUH\RXDUULYH%XWMXVWLQFDVH,¶PQRWWKHUH¶V
beer in the fridge. 
 
The paper or tape is ill suited to serve as a completing demonstration or to make salient a time to which the 
WRNHQRIµQRZ¶LVDQDSKRULFDOO\OLQNHG,WLVKDUGWRGLVSXWHWKDWLQWKLVFDVHWKHWRNHQRIµQRZ¶LVDSXUH
indexical that refers to the time it was produced.4 
A narrow survey of alleged problem cases for the classical account might encourage the thought 
that the classical account requires Cohen¶VSURSRVHGPRGLILFDWLRQ to deal with all or most cases in which 
the context of production and the context of tokening come apart.  But this is not at all the situation.  The 
XVHRIWKHWRNHQRIµQRZ¶LQWKHLPDJLQHGWRNHQRI6WRUHIHUWRWKHWLPHRIWKHWRNHQ¶VSURGXFWLRQLVQRW
XQW\SLFDORIXVHVRIµQRZ¶in letters, emails and podcasts.  The cases that pose a prima facie problem for 
the classical account are cases in which something special is going on.  I trust that this will become clear 
when I explain what exactly is going on in these cases. 
                                                          
4
 2¶0DGDJDLQ(2014) defends the context of tokening view from a range of apparent counterexamples with a strategy that relies 
on the assumption that the intentions of users of semantic tokens determine when the sounds or shapes they produce/deploy count 
as semantic tokensµ2XWVLGHRIWKHWLPHDQGSODFHDWZKLFKLWLVLQWHQGHGE\>LWVXVHU@WRH[SUHVVVRPHWKLQJ«¶KHDVVHUWVD
VRXQGRUVKDSHµ«ORVHVLWVVHPDQWLFWRNHQ-KRRG¶2¶0DGDJDLQ%XWDVVXPH± not unrealistically ± that the time you 
read/hear the message is not µRXWVLGHRIWKHWLPH«DWZKLFKLWLVLQWHQGHGWRH[SUHVVVRPHWKLQJ¶$VVXPHWKDWWKHPHVVDJHLV
LQWHQGHGWRH[SUHVVVRPHWKLQJWR\RXZKHQ\RXUHDGLW7KHQWKHFRQWH[WRIWRNHQLQJYLHZPXVWZURQJO\SUHGLFWWKDWµQRZ¶LQ
the message refers to the time it is read/played back. 
 6 
Let me mention another of these cases, which surprisingly has received little attention in the recent 
literature WKRXJK'RGGDQG6ZHHQH\DFNQRZOHGJHLWUHSUHVHQWVDµSUREOHP¶Dodd and Sweeney 
2010, 342) for their own account5.  Consider a voicemail message (for a landline number) of µ,DPQRWKHUH
QRZ¶.  This conveys the same content as the same phoneme played back on an answering machine.  It 
conveys that the person who recorded the message is not at the location associated with the number the 
caller has dialled at the time the message is played back.  µ1RZ¶LVXQGHUVWRRGDVWKHWLPHWKHPHVVDJHLV
playHGEDFNWKHWLPHµQRZ¶LVWRNHQHG %XWFRQVLGHUWKHWRNHQRIµKHUH¶ ,n the case of voicemail the 
location at which the message is played back is not the location associated with the number the caller has 
dialled.  The call is re-routed to the phone comSDQ\¶VSURFHVVLQJFHQWUHZKLFKVHQGVWKHµ,¶PQRWKHUH¶
message.  Imagine both the caller and the owner of the number called are aware of how the mechanism 
ZRUNV6WLOOZKHQWKHFDOOHUJHWVWKHPHVVDJHµ,¶PQRWKHUHQRZ¶VKHLQWHUSUHWVµKHUH¶WRUHIHU not to the 
processing centre but to the address associated with the number she dialled.  But according to the context 
of tokening view µKHUH¶UHIHUVWRWKHORFDWLRQDWZKLFKWKHPHVVDJHLVWRNHQHG, that is, the location at which 
it is played back6: the processing centre. 
The context of tokening view seemed to explain answering machine messages but it cannot 
straightforwardly explain voicemail messages!  Neither can any view that has it that either one of the context 
of production or the context of tokening is the context relevant to the semantic evaluation of both tokens of 
µQRZ¶DQGµKHUH¶LQDYRLFHPDLOPHVVDJHAs well as the classical account and the context of tokening view, 
these views include µFKDUDFWHUVKLIW¶views7 that have this consequence. 
The classical account cannot straightforwardly explain many puzzling uses of indexicals.  But the 
same goes for rival accounts of the semantics of indexicals OLNHDV,¶YHDUJXHGWKHFRQWH[WRIWRNHQLQJ
                                                          
5
 Dodd & Sweeney (2010) maintain that semantic evaluation of indexicals is with regard to either the context of production or the 
FRQWH[WRIWRNHQLQJZLWKWKHVSHDNHU¶VLQWHQWLRQVGHWHUPLQLQJZKLFKRIWKHVHLVWKHUHOHYDQW context.  Michaelson and Cohen 
FODVVWKLVYLHZDORQJZLWKµGR[DVWLFFRQWURO¶YLHZVOLNHWKHLQWHQGHGFRQWH[WYLHZ 
6
 ,IµWRNHQHG¶VXQGHUVWRRGVXFKWKDWWKHORFDWLRQDWZKLFKDQDQVZHULQJPDFKLQHPHVVDJHLVWRNHQHGLVWKHORFDWLRQDWZKLFKWKe 
recording device plays back the message (see footnote 3), then I assume the location at which a voicemail message is tokened is 
also the location at which the recording device plays back the message. 
7
 E.g. Michaelson (2014), Corazza, Fish and Gorvett (2002).  Character shift views associate more than one character-rule with a 
W\SHLQGH[LFDOSRVLWLQJDPHWDUXOHWKDWGHWHUPLQHVZKLFKRIWKHµVKLIWLQJFKDUDFWHUV¶LVDVVRFLDWHGZLWKDJLYHQWRNHQRIWKe 
indexical. 
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view.  No account of the semantics of indexicals8 can explain all the puzzling cases without the help of a 
story or stories about how the conveyed content in some cases is extra-semantic.  If this is so then the 
classical account cannot be faulted for appealing to such a story or stories if it there is a plausible story it 
can appeal to.  I will defend the classical account by telling a plausible story it can appeal to. 
 
2. ,W¶VDOOLQWKHJDPH 
 
$WRNHQRIµQRZ¶LQDQDQVZHULQJPDFKLQHPHVVDJH, I maintain, if it refers at all9, refers to the time the 
message was recorded.  But the message conveys extra-semantic content concerning the time the message 
is played back.  How?  The key notion my account of the interpretation of answering machine messages 
employs is the notion of pretence.  When you hear an answering machine message you can recognise a 
salient game of make-believe whose rules prescribe that you imagine that the agent who recorded the 
answering machine message is speaNLQJWR\RXDWWKHSODFH\RX¶UHFDOOLQJDWWKHWLPH\RX¶UHKHDULQJWKH
message.   
I will fill in the details below.  But let me motivate my proposal with a couple of cases in which the 
interpretation of token indexicals obviously involves pretence.  Imagine Emma wants to tell us about a new 
colleague, Todd.  She imitates Todd¶VYRLFHDQGmanner ± she pretends to be Todd ± and utters a token of 
(2).  
 
(2) ,¶Pthe new global marketing director.   
 
If we recognise that Emma is pretending to be Todd and recognise the point of the pretence we will 
understand what Emma wants to impart: that Todd is the new global marketing director. 
                                                          
8
 This includes the intended context view and the recognised context view.  See Michaelson & Cohen 2013. 
9
 I am inclined to follow Stevens (2009) in denying that tokens that are not asserted have semantic content. 
 8 
Or imagine a token of (3) finger-scrawled by Emily on a dirty car10. 
 
(3) I need a wash. 
 
Emily¶VDFWLRQLQYLWHVXVWRPDNHEHOLHYH that the car can communicate.  If we recognise this - the familiarity 
of the conceit that cars can talk will help - and recognise the point of the game of make-believe, we will 
understand what Emily wants to impart: that the car needs a wash.  
These examples are instances - obvious instances I would urge - of externally oriented prop based 
make-believe.  In a game of prop based make-believeDFFRUGLQJWR.HQGDOO:DOWRQ¶VLQIOXHQWLDODFFRXQW 
(see Walton 1990, 1993), what is true in the game ± what is fictional ± depends on real facts about features 
of the world that are utilised by the game as props11.  For instance Walton describes a game in which the 
location of a tree stump makes DQXWWHUDQFHRIµWKHUHLVDEHDUDWWKHERWWRPRIWKHJDUGHQ¶true in the game.  
7KHµSULQFLSOHVRIJHQHUDWLRQ¶WKDW determine how what is true in the game depends on features of the real 
world are implicitly understood by participants.  The dependence of fictional truths on real facts allows for 
fictional truths that participants may not recognise as such.  It is true in the game that there is a bear behind 
the laurel bush even though no one has seen the tree stump lurking there.  But this dependence also allows 
utterances of fictional truths to be used to convey real truths.  It alloZVXVWRµSUHWHQGWKDWWKHZRUOGLVD
certain way, not in order to pursue the imaginative thought that the world is that way, but to say something 
DERXWWKHUHDOZRUOGWKDWSURYLGHVWKHRFFDVLRQRIWKHSUHWHQVH¶.URRQ2009, 247).   
 Walton and others disWLQJXLVKµFRQWHQWRULHQWHGPDNH-EHOLHYH¶SDUWLFLSDQWVLQZKLFKSXUVXHWKH
LPDJLQDWLYHWKRXJKWWKDWWKHZRUOGLVDFHUWDLQZD\IURPµSURSRULHQWHG¶RUµH[WHUQDOO\RULHQWHG¶PDNH-
believe, participants in which exploit the pretence to convey information about the real-world facts that 
facilitate the pretence.  Take an example from Catherine Wearing.  Annie is pretending that her bicycle is 
                                                          
10
 This example is appropriated, and repurposed, from (2¶0DGDJDLQ, 2012). 
11
 Semantic tokens can count as props.  Walton takes the semantic tokens that constitute works of fiction to be props.  We pretend 
that these tokens are true accounts of real events.  In the cases I will discuss the relevant games involve imagining token 
indexicals to have different contexts of production. 
 9 
DKRUVH 6KHFDQPDNHXWWHUDQFHVOLNHµP\KRUVHLVJRLQJWRZLQWKH'HUE\¶µZLWKDQ eye to the make-
believe itself¶ (Wearing 2011, 502) as Wearing puts it.  But imagine now tKDW$QQLH¶VPRWKHUVHHVWKDW
Annie KDVOHIWKHUELF\FOHRXWLQWKHUDLQ6KHVD\VµWKHKRUVHLVJHWWLQJZHW\Ru should put it back in its 
stable¶12.  This is a case of prop oriented make-believe.  AnnLH¶VPRWKHUZDQWVWRFRQYH\WR$QQLHWKDWKHU
bicycle is getting wet.  Her utterance has this serious purpose.  But she achieves this purpose by joining in 
the gameµ7KHKRUVHLVJHWWLQJZHW¶LVWUXHLQWKHJDPH just LILQUHDOLW\$QQLH¶V bicycle is getting wet.  The 
LQIRUPDWLRQ$QQLH¶VPRWKHU¶VXWWHUDQFH conveys is thus that the real-world circumstance that would make 
WKHWRNHQRIµWKHKRUVHLVJHWWLQJZHW¶true in the game obtains. 
When a linguistic token is deployed in externally oriented make-believe WKH DXGLHQFH¶s 
understanding RIWKHµSULQFLSOHVRIJHQHUDWLRQ¶ that dictate the real-word circumstances under which the 
linguistic token is true in the game allows for the identification of what the token is intended to convey, 
which is that the real-world circumstance that would make the token true in the game obtains.  This account 
precisely captures what happens in the µglobal marketing director¶DQGµWDONLQJFDU¶Hxamples.  In the former 
example the wider conversational context (we may have asked Emma µVRZKR¶VWKLV Todd guy"¶PDNHV
obvious that the point of the pretence is to impart information about Todd: the pretence is externally 
oriented.  The rules of the game prescribe that participants make believe that the words coming out of 
Emma¶VPRXWKDUHXWWHUHGE\Todd, and so a self-referential utterance is to be imagined to refer to Todd 
and is true in the game just if it would really be true if uttered by Todd.  Because we understand the 
principles of generation of the game, Emma¶VXWWHUDQFH succeeds in conveying that the circumstance that 
would make the token true in the game obtains.  That is, it succeeds in conveying that Todd is the new 
global marketing director.  In tKHµWDONLQJFDU¶example the remarkable filthiness of the car is plausibly itself 
a clue that the point of the pretence is to draw attention to this external circumstance.  The rules of the game 
of make-believe instigated by Emily prescribe that participants make believe that the car has uttered any 
linguistic tokens that appear on it, and so the token inscribed by Emily is true in the game just if it would 
                                                          
12
 ,¶YHPRGLILHG:HDULQJ¶VH[DPSOHVOLJKWO\VRWKDWWKHPRWKHUDVVHUWVDQGGRHVQ¶WPHUHO\FRPPDQG 
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be true if uttered by the car.  Because we understand the principles of generation of the game, Emily¶V
inscription succeeds in conveying that the circumstance that would make it true in the game obtains.  That 
is, it succeeds in conveying that the car needs a wash. 
7KHFDU¶VQHHGLQJDZDVKPDNHV WKH WRNHQRI  true in the game because the token of (3) is 
fictionally uttered by the car.  And Todd¶VEHLQJthe new global marketing director makes the token of (2) 
true in the game, because the token is fictionally uttered by Todd7KHWRNHQRIµ,¶LQHDFKFDVHDVSHUWKH
classical account, is calculated to refer to the producer of the token - the agent of the context of production 
- LW¶VMXVWWKDWILFWLRQDOO\WKHDJHQWLVVRPHRQHRUWKLQJRWKHUWKDQWKHUHDOSURGXFHURIWKHWRNHQ,QWKH
case of a linguistic token involving indexicals that is uttered in the course of a game of make-believe we 
PD\VSHDNRIWKHµILFWLRQDOFRQWH[W¶± the fictional agent, fictional time and fictional place ± that determines 
WKHµILFWLRQDOFRQWHQW¶RIWKHWRNen.  If a token that is pretend-asserted can be said to have a real content this 
can differ from the fictional content of the token.  If Emma¶VXWWHUDQFHKDVDUHDOFRQWHQWIRULQVWDQFHWKHQ
its content is the proposition that Emma is the new global marketing director. 
This is a good point at which to let slip that my proposal about the interpretation of answering 
machine messages is not completely original.  The suggestion that interpretation of token indexicals can 
involve pretence is considered and rejected by Corazza, Fish and Gorvett (2002), and Mount (2008)13, and 
defended by Voltolini (2006).  But Corazza, Fish and Gorvett assume that in the cases they discuss the 
communicated content is semantic content.  They argue that neither DWRNHQ¶VSURGXFHU¶VSUHWHQGLQJ, nor 
WKHDXGLHQFH¶VEHOLHYLQJWKDWWKHWRNHQ¶VSURGXFHULVSUHWHQGLQJ, elevates fictional content to the status of 
semantic content (Corazza, Fish and Gorvett, 2002, 9).  9ROWROLQL¶V UHSO\ to Corazza, Fish and Gorvett 
correctly points out that the rule governed nature of games of make believe ensures that there can be a 
prescription to pretend that p even if no one is pretending or believed to be pretending that p (for instance 
the prescription to pretend that there is a bear behind the laurel bush).  The fictional context associated with 
                                                          
13
 Mount maintains that for a pretence-invoking account to explain away her counterexamples to Kaplan and other theorists who 
assume WKDWWKHUHDUHµSXUHLQGH[LFDOV¶µDORWPRUHPXVWEHVDLG¶0RXQWS,WU\LQWKLVSDSHUWRVD\HQRXJKWRPDNHLW
obvious how the counterexamples can be explained away ± at least those that need to be (I am open to the possibility that tokens 
of µ,¶µKHUH¶DQGµQRZ¶DUHQRWDOZD\VXVHGDVSXUHLQGH[LFDOV 
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a token indexical is determined independently RIWKHVSHDNHU¶V communicative LQWHQWLRQVDQGWKHDXGLHQFH¶V
beliefs about those intentions and in line with conventions governing the fiction.  This, Voltolini maintains, 
is sufficient to elevate fictional content to the status of semantic content.  9ROWROLQL¶VµILFWLRQDOLVW¶DFFRXQW
KDVLWWKDWµZKHQHYHUWKHFRQWH[WUHOHYDQWIRUWKHVHPDQWLFLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIDQLQGH[LFDOVHQWHQFHLVQRWLWV
proper context of utterance, that FRQWH[WLV«DILFWLRQDOFRQWH[W¶9ROWROLQL, 27)   
But 9ROWROLQL¶VµILFWLRQDOLVW¶DFFRXQWRIWKHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRILQGH[LFDOVKDVQRWZRQZLGHVXSSRUW
It is not at all evident that the conventions governing a fiction can elevate fictional content to the status of 
semantic content.  These conventions can make a tree stump a pretend-EHDUEXWWKH\FDQ¶WPDNHDWUHHVWXPS
a bear.  And pretence is most evidently involved in cases thatLQ&RKHQ¶VSKUDVHVHHPµULSHIRUWUHDWPHQW
by some standard story about the conveyance of extrasemantic content roughly in the tradition of Grice 
¶&RKHQ, 9 footnote 10).  While giving due credit to Voltolini for what I think is the key insight 
into the interpretation of puzzling uses of indexicals - that it involves pretence - I want to make another use 
of this insight, by invoking the distinction between content oriented and externally oriented make-believe.  
There is no need to elevate fictional content to the status of semantic content.  Because externally oriented 
make-believe is a means of imparting extra-semantic content.14  
 
     * 
 
In externally oriented make-believe, a semantic token is used to convey that certain real-world 
circumstances obtain: those circumstances whose obtaining would make the token true in the game.  The 
proposition that these circumstances obtain is, I am maintaining, not the semantic content of the utterance 
used to convey it.  As Stanley points out, whereas the semantic meaning of an expression is plausibly a 
function of the meanings of its parts, µWKHPHFKDQLVPRISUHWHQVHFHUWDLQO\GRHVQRWUHVSHFWFRPSRVLWLRQDO
                                                          
14
 I am going to argue for this against those who would ± implausibly ± deny it.  But let me be fair to Voltolini in distinguishing 
what he says from how others take the suggestion that pretence can affect the semantic content of linguistic tokens.  Voltolini, 
unlike others who make this claim, only applies it to token indexicals, and his account has it that the character of the token 
indexicals is not affected by pretence, only the context on which the character rules operate to yield the semantic content. 
 12 
interpretation of the truth-FRQGLWLRQV H[SUHVVHGE\D VHQWHQFH UHODWLYH WR D FRQWH[W¶ 6WDQOH\, 41).  
7KLQNDERXW:HDULQJ¶VH[DPSOH7KHSURSRVLWLRQFRQYH\HGE\$QQLH¶VPRWKHULVWUXHRQO\LIDELF\FOHLV
JHWWLQJZHW7KHVHQWHQFHXVHGWRFRQYH\WKLVSURSRVLWLRQGRHVQ¶WLQFOXGHWKHZRUGµELF\FOH¶,WLQFOXGHV
WKH ZRUG µKRUVH¶  :H FDQ HDVLO\ DYRLG VD\LQJ WKDW WKLV VHQWHQFH ± compositionality be damned ± 
semantically encodes DSURSRVLWLRQDERXWDELF\FOHLIZHDOORZWKDWWKHSURSRVLWLRQFRQYH\HGE\$QQLH¶V
mother is extra-semantic content.   
I suggest that it is obvious that a content conveyed via externally oriented make-believe is not the 
semantic content of the utterance used to convey it.  But David Hills, who invokes externally oriented make-
believe to explain the interpretation of metaphorsGRHVQ¶WILQGWKLV obvious in the cases he is interested in.  
$FFRUGLQJWR+LOOVZHXQGHUVWDQGµ-XOLHWLVWKHVXQ¶WRFonvey that Juliet has the real-world features that 
make it fictional, in a game with certain principles of generation, that Juliet is the sun.  Hills argues (1997, 
127) that WKLVSURSRVLWLRQLVWKHWRNHQ¶VVHPDQWLFFRQWHQW, by making a comparison with a typical case of 
conversational implicature.  A token RIµ0U;is punctual and KDVEHDXWLIXOKDQGZULWLQJ¶FRQYH\VWKDW0U
X is not a good philosopher but, as Hills puts it, µ,FDQ¶WSURSHUO\UHJLVWHUP\GLVDJUHHPHQW¶Hills 1997, 
127) with the implicated proposition by replying µQRKHGRHVQ¶W¶7KHUHSO\µQRKHGRHVQ¶W¶ZRXOGEHWDNHQ
WRH[SUHVVGLVDJUHHPHQWZLWKWKHVHPDQWLFPHDQLQJRIµ0U;LVSXQFWXDODQGKDVEHDXWLIXOKDQGZULWLQJ¶, 
rather than with the extra-semantic content the author of the token intends to convey.  But if Romeo utters 
µ-XOLHWLVWKH6XQ¶\RXFDQUHJLVWHU\RXUGLVDJUHHPHQWZLWKWKHSURSRVLWLRQ5RPHR intends to convey by 
UHSO\LQJµQRVKHLVQ¶W¶  Hills concludes from this that µ«it would appear that Romeo's meaning gets lodged 
in Romeo's words in a way that Grice's meaning (in the letter of recommendation example) never gets 
ORGJHGLQ*ULFH
V¶ (Hills 1997, 127). 
+LOOV¶H[SODQDWLRQRIZK\,FDQUHJLVWHUP\GLVDJUHHPHQWZLWKWKHFRQYH\HGFRQWHQWRIµ-XOLHWLV
WKH6XQ¶by using a form of words that is appropriate to express a denial of the semantic content is that the 
conveyed content is the semantic content.  +LOOV¶DUJXPHQWIDLOVEHFDXVH there is an alternative explanation.  
The alternative explaQDWLRQLVWKDWP\XWWHUDQFHRIµQRVKHLVQ¶W¶LVDOVRXWWHUHGLQSUHWHQFH,¶PMRLQLQJLQ
the game.  7KHVHPDQWLFFRQWHQWRIµQRVKHLVQ¶W¶FRQWUDGLFWVWKHSURSRVLWLRQWKDW-XOLHWLVWKHVXQ,SUHWHQG
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to deny that Juliet is the sun.  I thereby convey, extra-semantically, that it is not the case that Juliet has the 
features that would make it true in the game that Juliet is the sun.   
,Q FDVHV OLNH WKH OHWWHURI UHFRPPHQGDWLRQFDVH WKHGHQLDO µQRKHGRHVQ¶W¶ LV WDNHQ WRGHQ\ WKH
semantic content of the tokHQWKHGHQLHULVUHVSRQGLQJWR%XWWKDW¶VEHFDXVHLQWKHVHFDVHVWKHGHQLDOLV
WDNHQOLWHUDOO\,IP\UHSO\WR5RPHR¶VXWWHUDQFHZDVWDNHQOLWHUDOO\LWZRXOGbe taken to deny the semantic 
FRQWHQWRI5RPHR¶VXWWHUDQFH,PDJLQHDSHGDQWRUDOLWHUDOPLQGHGFKLOG-XOLHW¶VVLVWHUUHSO\LQJµQRVKH¶V
QRWVKH¶VDKXPDQEHLQJ¶$GHQLDORIWKLVVRrt denies the semantic content: that Juliet is the Sun.  But if 
the option of joining in the pretence is open to me I can use the same form of words to deny another 
proposition.   
The comparison with conversational implicature thus fails to show that the content conveyed by 
means of externally-oriented make-believe is semantic content.  This content in fact bears the hallmarks of 
a conversational implicature.  Implicatures15 are cancellable: if an utterance whose semantic content is P 
implicates Q, it is possible for the speaker to add a clause that denies Q and thereby commit herself to P 
without committing herself to Q.  Adding a clause that denies P would result in a contradiction.  But because 
the implicated content Q is only loosely linked to the semantic content P, adding a clause that denies Q 
does not yield a contradiction (unless the utterance is contradictory to start with).  To µ0U;KDVEHDXWLIXO
handwriting,¶ *ULFHFDQFRQVLVWHQWO\DGGµEXWKH¶V DOVRDQH[FHOOHQWSKLORVRSKHU¶. 
The content conveyed by means of externally-oriented make-believe LV FDQFHOODEOH  $QQLH¶V
mother can consistently DGGµGRQ¶WZRUU\\RXUELF\FOHLVQ¶Wgetting wet, the rain is also just part of the 
game¶.  Neither would Romeo contradict himself if he uWWHUHGµ-XOLHWLVWKHVXQ6KHGRHVQ¶WPDNHPH feel 
warm and happy; thaW¶VQRWZKDW ,PHDQ.  My monist metaphysical theory entails that Juliet is literally 
LGHQWLFDOWRWKHVXQ¶ 
Conversational implicatures are also typically non-detachable.  Unlike conventional implicatures 
HJ WKH LPSOLFDWXUH RI µ$ EXW %¶ WKDW LW LV XQXVXDO IRU µ$¶ DQG µ%¶ WR ERWK EH WUXH FRQYHUVDWLRQDO
                                                          
15
 7KHH[FHSWLRQEHLQJLPSOLFDWXUHVRIXWWHUDQFHVWKDWDUHHQWDLOHGE\WKHXWWHUDQFHV¶VHPDQWLFFRQWHQWV 
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LPSOLFDWXUHVDUHµQRWWULJJHUHGE\WKHXVHRISDUWLFXODUOexical items in the sentence uttered¶ (Blome Tillman 
2013, 173) HJµEXW¶LQWKHDERYHH[DPSOH6RDs Grice (1975, 39) puts it, µit is not possible to find another 
way of saying the same thing, which simply lacks the implicature in question¶.  The content conveyed by 
$QQLH¶VPRWKHULQ:HDULQJ¶VH[DPSOHLVQRQ-detachableµ7he champion steed in yonder ILHOGZLOOJHWZHW¶ 
would convey the same information.   
$QLPSOLFDWXUHLVQ¶WOLQNHGWRDQutterance by a semantic meaning-convention, but rather by the 
fact that knowledge of semantic meanings, speaker intentions and general principles of rational 
communication allow interpreters to work out what is being implicated16.  Thus the third hallmark of 
conversational implicatures, for Grice, is calculability.   
When the audience recognises externally-oriented make-believe they recognise an intention to 
convey information about the world17.  But at the same time the rules of conversation that anyone with such 
an intention is assumed to be following are recognisably flouted.  These rules demand truth and relevance 
but LWLVQ¶WOLWHUDOO\WUXHWKDWWKHUHLVDUHOHYDQWKRUVHWhat is in danger of getting wet.  The audience can 
conclude that they must look past the literal meaning of the speaker¶s words for the content that the speaker 
intends to communicate.  They can then bring to bear their understanding of the principles of generation of 
the recognised game of make believe to identify a relevant proposition - the proposition that the 
circumstance that makes the VSHDNHU¶V XWWerance true in the game obtains - DV WKH VSHDNHU¶V LQWHQGHG
meaning18. 
,GRQ¶WZDQWWRinsist ± against any interpreter of Grice who would say otherwise ± that the contents 
conveyed by externally oriented make believe can be classed as a type of conversational implicature.  But 
*ULFH¶VIUDPHZRUNVWDQGVDVWKHFDQRQLFDOWUHDWPHQWRIWKHFRQYH\DQFHRIH[WUD-semantic content to the 
                                                          
16
 µ&DOFXODEOH¶PHDQVFDOFXODEOHLQSULQFLSOH,QPDQ\FDVHVRILPSOLFDWXUH± especially, as I will note below, generalised 
conversational implicature ± it is implausible that interpreters perform the calculations. 
17
 Even when externally oriented make believe occurs in the midst of content oriented make believe the serious communicative 
intent can be evident from a tone of voice ± LPDJLQH$QQLH¶VPRWKHU¶VVXGGHQO\FRQFHUQHGWRQHDVVKHXWWHUVµWKHKRUVHZLOOJHW
ZHW¶± or some obviously remarkable feature of a prop.  These are the sort of clues the audience relies on in figuring out that an 
instance of pretence is externally oriented and is thus intended as a means of communicating information about the world.   
18
 I am inclined to agree with Rysiew (2000) that the calculation in many cases of conversational implicature is an inference to 
the best explanation rather than a deduction. 
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H[WHQWWKDWLWLVH[SHFWHGWKDWDQDFFRXQWRIDQDOOHJHGFDVHVKRXOGEHµURXJKO\LQWKHWUDGLWLRQRI*ULFH¶
$QGWKHUHLVDQDVSHFWRI*ULFH¶VIUDPHZRUN± the notion of a generalised conversational implicature - that 
I will invoke below.  I am thus not at all reluctant to suggest that the content conveyed by a piece of 
externally oriented make-believe may be categorised as a conversational implicature; and the utterances 
involving indexicals that I am urging are examples of externally oriented make-believe are certainly no 
exception here.  In the talking car case and the global marketing director case the conveyed content is 
calculable.  In each case it can be seen that the token is not intended to/cannot be taken literally.  The literal 
meaning if there is one is false or irrelevant.  I have described above how in each case the recognition of 
prescriptions to believe in certain ways allows for the identification of a relevant FRQWHQWDVWKHVSHDNHU¶V
intended meaning.  And in each case the conveyed message can be canceOOHG(PPDFDQDGGµEXW7RGG 
LVQ¶W the global marketing director¶ without contradiction, and Emily can apSHQG µ,¶P UHDOO\GLUW\; and 
unlike this car, which is quite happy to be dirty, ,¶PQRW¶ 
But in any event - and this is the important point - HYHQLI*ULFH¶VIUDPHZRUNLVQRWDJRRGILW the 
content conveyed by externally oriented make believe is extra-semantic content.  This means that my story 
is not an alternative to the classical account.  It is instead an attempt to pass off the content conveyed by 
certain utterances involving indexicals ± that differ from the contents predicted by the classical account ± 
as extra-semantic.  
 
     * 
   
 Can the story that, I suggest, obviously applies in the cases of the imagined utterances of (2) and 
(3), be applied to other controversial cases?  In particular to the case of answering machine and voicemail 
messages?  I will work my way towards the case of answering machine messages by applying the account 
to two more cases from the literature. 
 First a case from Corazza, Fish and Gorvett. 
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Joe is not in his office one day and Ben notices that a number of students keep approaching his door and knocking. 
They then stand around and look bemused for a while before leaving. Taking pity on these poor souls wasting their 
WLPH%HQGHFLGHVWRDWWDFKKLV³,DPQRWKHUHWRGD\´QRWHWR-RH¶VGRRU7KHWULFNZRUNVWKHVWXGHQWVLQVWHDGRI
knocking and waiting, take one look at the note and then leave. . . . (Corazza, Fish and Gorvett 2002, 5) 
 
If the token of (4) has a literal meaning it is the proposition that Ben is not here today. 
 
(4) I am not here today 
 
The token conveys the intended meaning - that Joe is not here today - to students who are unaware that Joe 
GLGQ¶WZULWHWKHQRWHKLPVHOI7KHµWULFN¶ZRUNVRQWKHVHVWXGHQWVEHFDXVHWKH\WDNHµ,¶WRUHIHUWo the person 
they assume wrote the note.    
But imagine the students are aware that Ben ZURWHWKHQRWHLW¶VQRW-RH¶VKDQGZULWLQJDQGDUH
aware that he LVQ¶WMXVWKRSLQJWKH\ZRQ¶WUHDOLVHWKLV.  The students can discount the semantic meaning as 
the intended meaning.  %HQ¶VDEVHQFH- even if he was absent - would be irrelevant.  The students grasp the 
intended meaning by recognising the note as a prop in a salient game of make-believe whose rules prescribe 
that they imagine that the note was written by Joe.  They can recognise the pretence has a serious purpose: 
LW¶VH[WHUQDOO\RULHQWHG7KH\FDQWKXVUHFRJQLVH the intended message: that the circumstance that would 
make the token of (4) true in the game obtains.  That is, that Joe is not in his office today.  
The second case is due WR&DWKDO2¶0DGDJDLQ  &RQVLGHU a recorded or transmitted 
message on the bus tour of Jurassic Park. 
 
(5) Here you can see T-Rex 
 
If this has a literal meaning it is the proposition that T-Rex is visible at the place the message was 
recorded.  The tourists can discount this irrelevant proposition as the intended meaning.  There is a natural 
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tendency, I suggest, when you hear a recorded voice, to imagine the owner of the voice is speaking there 
(or if you are listening through a telephoQHDWWKHSODFH\RX¶UHFDOOLQJ) and then.  The message exploits 
this.  The tourists can recognise a salient game whose rules mandate the pretence that the token of (5) is 
being uttered at the time and place it is heard: that a tour guide is there in person uttering it19.  The game 
has a recognisable serious purpose: to convey information about the environs of the bus.  The pretence can 
thus be recognised for what it is, and the information that it is intended to convey identified.  What it 
conveys it that the circumstance whose obtaining would make the token of (5) true in the game obtains, that 
is, that T Rex is visible in the vicinity of the bus.  
)LQDOO\ WKHQ WRDQVZHULQJPDFKLQHDQGYRLFHPDLOPHVVDJHV«.  Let TR and LR be the time and 
location at which a token of (1) is recorded.  Let TP be the time at which the message is played back and let 
LC be the location associated with the phone number that is called.  In the case of answering machine 
messages, but not in the case of voicemail messages, LC is the location at which the message is played back: 
WKHORFDWLRQDWZKLFKLWLVµWRNHQHG¶.  The literal content of the token (if it has one), is that the agent who 
recorded the message is not at LR at TR.  But this false and irrelevant proposition is not what the played-
back message conveys.  The played back message conveys that the agent is not at LC at TP. 
How does it convey this?  Like the tour bus message, answering machine and voicemail messages 
exploit your natural tendency, when you hear a recorded voice, to imagine the owner of the voice is 
VSHDNLQJ,QWKLVFDVHDV\RX¶re listening through a telephone, the tendency is to imagine the owner of the 
voice speaking DWWKHSODFH\RX¶UHFDlling.  You can recognise a salient game whose rules mandate the 
pretence that the owner of the voice is uttering the token of (1) at LC at TP. 
You can also recognise that the make-believe is externally oriented.  Its purpose, you can recognise, 
is to convey the information that a real-world circumstance obtains: the circumstance whose obtaining 
would make the token of (1) true in the game.  Because the game involves imagining that the agent is 
XWWHULQJµ,DPQRWKHUHQRZ¶DWLC at TP, the absence of the agent from LC at TP is the only circumstance 
                                                          
19
 Or that the device that plays/transmits the token is the utterer of the token. 
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that would make the token of µ,DPQRWKHUHQRZ¶ true in the game.  The message thus conveys that the 
agent is absent from LC at TP. 
Participants in externally oriented make-EHOLHYH UHPHPEHU µSUHWHQG WKDW WKHZRUOG LVDFHUWDLQ
way, not in order to pursue the imaginative thought that the world is that way, but to say something about 
WKHUHDOZRUOGWKDWSURYLGHVWKHRFFDVLRQRIWKHSUHWHQVH¶.URRQ, 247).  It is not then a problem for 
WKHDFFRXQW,¶YHMXVWJLYHQWKDWIXOO\LPDJLQLQJKRZWKLQJVZRXOGKDYHWREHIRUWKHWRNHQRIWREHWUXH
if uttered by the agent who recorded it would involve imagining something impossible.  For the token to be 
true the agent would have to be absent but also, in order to utter the token, the agent would have to be 
present.  Bear in mind that fully imagining how things would have to be for a car to be an agent capable of 
producing semantic tokens is also difficult.  We are very good at bracketing the strange or impossible 
consequences of the things we make-believe.  However the key point is that there is no onus on you when 
you hear an answering machine message to imagine an impossible situation.  Calculating the extra-semantic 
content associated with the message involves deploying knowledge of the rules of a salient game of make-
believe to identify the circumstance that would make the token of (1) true in the game.  And this is easy.  
The absence of the agent from LC at TP is the only circumstance that would make the token true in the 
game.20 
 
      * 
 
                                                          
20
 A reviewer has drawn my attention to the objectiRQWKDWLIP\DFFRXQWLVDFFXUDWHWKHQDWRNHQRIµ,DPKHUHQRZDQGDOVRQRW
KHUHQRZ¶FRXOGVXFFHVVIXOO\FRPPXQLFDWHZKDWDWRNHQRIFRPPXQLFDWHV7KHDEVHQFHRIWKHDJHQWIURPLC at TP  is the 
unique circumstance that suffices to make this token true in the game.  But this token cannot be used to communicate that this 
circumstance obtains.  My reply to the objection notes that whereas the second conjunct of this token is true in the game on 
account of a real-world circumstance (the absence of the agent), the first conjunct is true in the game because it follows by the 
LQWHUQDOORJLFRIWKHJDPH,IWKHSXUSRVHRIWKHWRNHQLVWRGUDZDWWHQWLRQWRWKHDJHQW¶VDEVHQFHWKHQLWLVXQQHFHVVDU\± a breach 
of conversational rules ± to use the conjunction.  Use of the conjunction forces an interpreter to try to identify two external 
circumstances: one that would make the first conjunct true in the game and one that would make the second conjunct true in the 
game.  But there is no extra external circumstance that makes the first conjunct true in the game.  The conjunction thus sows 
FRQIXVLRQ7KDWH[SODLQVFRQVLVWHQWO\ZLWKP\DFFRXQWZK\LWFDQ¶WEHXVHGWRFRPPXQLFDWHDWUXWK 
 19 
 I follow Walton in refraining from insisting that the interpreter of an utterance deployed in 
externally oriented make believe must actively imagine what it would take for the utterance to be literally 
true. 21   :DOWRQVD\VWKDWLWLVHQRXJKWKDWE\µUHFRJQL]>LQJ@>DQ@LPSOLHGJDPH>RIPDNH-EHOLHYH@¶VKHLV
µDZDUHRISUHVFULSWLRQVWRLPDJLQHLQFHUWDLQZD\V¶:DOWRQ49). 
 What sort of phenomenology then, does my account predict for the interpretation of answering 
machine messages and the other linguistic tokens I would apply it to?  I would point to plausible examples 
of externally oriented make-EHOLHYHOLNH:HDULQJ¶VH[DPSOHDQGPHWDSKRULFDOVSHHFKDQGVD\µWKDWNLQGRI
SKHQRPHQRORJ\¶  But that kind of phenomenology, I suggest, is not a unified kind.  In examples like 
:HDULQJ¶VDQGLQFDVHVRILQWHUSUHtation of unfamiliar metaphors OLNHµ-XOLHWLVWKHVXQ¶LWLVSODXVLEOe that 
WKHDXGLHQFH¶VH[SHULHQFHUHIOHFWVDQDZDUHQHVVRISUHVFULSWLRQVWRLPDJLQHLQFHUWDLQZD\VDQGDSURFHVV
of calculation of the imparted content that draws on these prescriptions.  But in other cases ± cases of 
familiar metaphors OLNHµKHZDVERLOLQJ¶ for instance ± this phenomenology seems to be lacking. 
 What I predict then is that in some of the cases my account applies to ± the global marketing director 
case for instance ± WKHDXGLHQFH¶V H[SHULHQFH UHIOHFWV D FDOFXODWLRQRI WKH FRQYH\HGFRQWHQW of the sort 
detailed in my discussion of that case.  But in other cases ± the case of answering machine messages is a 
prime example22  ± because the association of a certain type of token and a certain type of content are 
routine, WKHDXGLHQFH¶VJrasp of the imparted content may be more or less instantaneous. 
The association between answering machine messages and the contents they convey, I am granting, 
is conventional.  But it is important to be clear about the nature of the convention.  The contents conveyed 
by answering machine messages, I suggest, are what Grice called generalised conversational implicatures, 
or are the sort of thing Grice attempted to capture with this notion.  Conversational implicatures come in 
WZRNLQGV« 
 
                                                          
21
 In my own case I can report that hearing an answering machine message prompts me to imagine that the owner of the voice is 
VSHDNLQJWRPHDQGPRVWRIWKRVHZKR,¶YHDVNHGDERXWWKLV± but not all ± report similar phenomenology. 
22
 7KLVPD\QRWKDYHEHHQWKHFDVHLQWKHHDUO\GD\VRIDQVZHULQJPDFKLQHV,SRVWGLFWWKDWLWZDVQ¶W 
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[P]articularized conversational implicatures [are] cases in which an implicature is carried by saying that p on a 
particular occasion in virtue of special features of the context, cases in which there is no room for the idea that an 
implicature is normally carried by saying that p.  But there are cases of generalized conversational implicature.  
Sometimes one can say that the use of a certain form of words in an utterance would normally (in the absence of 
special circumstances) carry such-and-such an implicature or type of implicature. (Grice 1975 [1989], pp. 37-40) 
 
Tokens of (GCI) %ORPH 7LOOPDQ¶V H[DPSOH, if the speaker is married to a man, typically carry the 
LPSOLFDWXUHWKDWWKHGLQQHUGDWHLVQRWWKHVSHDNHU¶VKXVEDQG 
 
(GCI) ,¶PPHHWLQJDPDQIRUGLQQHUWRQLJKW 
 
BORPH7LOOPDQH[SODLQVWKDWµ*&,VQHHGWREHFDUHIXOO\GLVWLQJXLVKHGIrom conventional implicatures: even 
though GCIs may seem to be triggered by default, they are not part of the conventional meanings of the 
ZRUGVXVHGLQWKHXWWHUDQFH¶Blome Tillman 2013, 181)   
 The association of answering machine messages with the content imparted by the externally 
oriented make believe described above is so routine, I suggest, that this content counts as a GCI.  GCIs, 
though like all conversational implicatures calculable in principle, are not typically calculated.  And so it 
is not to be expected that the phenomenology of the interpretation of answering machine tokens of (1) 
should reveal a process of calculation of the sort I have suggested could be deployed to work out the 
communicated content. 
 
3. An Objection 
 
The content conveyed by an answering machine messages is calculable.  If it is a conversational implicature 
then it is also cancellable.  But Michaelson and Cohen maintain that the content conveyed by an answering 
machine message is not cancellable. 
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An answering machine token of (1) conveys a proposition regarding the whereabouts of the agent 
at TP.  Michaelson and Cohen point out that the result of adding DµFDQFHOODWLRQFODXVH¶WKDWFRQWUDGLFWVthis 
proposition is an overall utterance - a token of (1¶) - WKDWLVµLQIHOLFLWRXV¶.     
 
(¶) I am not here now, but I might be when this message is played back. 
 
Michaelson and Cohen take the infelicity of the WRNHQRI¶WRVhow that the truth conveyed by 
the token of (1) is not cancellable, extra-semantic content.  But as Jonas Akerman points out this is a 
mistake.  Michaelson and Cohen assume that the explanation of the infelicity of the WRNHQRI¶LVWKDW the 
WRNHQRIµ,DPQRWKHUHQRZ¶ has as its semantic content a proposition that is contradicted by the semantic 
FRQWHQWRIWKHFDQFHOODWLRQFODXVHµEXW,PLJKWEHZKHQWKLVPHVVDJHLVSOD\HGEDFN¶.23  But Akerman points 
out that there is another explanation of the infelicity of the WRNHQRI¶  ,f a token of (1) expresses a 
µORJLFDOIDOVHKRRG¶ as Kaplan maintained, but nonetheless pragmatically conveys a truth, then the effect of 
cancelling this truth by adding a clause that contradicts it is to force the interpreter to go back to the semantic 
meaning of the token of (1).  The interpreter is forced to take the token of (1) literally and taken literally it 
is incoherent.  
In other words, if the classical account is correct and the true content conveyed by an answering 
machine token of (1) is cancellable extra-semantic content, then there is an alternative explanation of the 
LQIHOLFLW\ RI D WRNHQ RI ¶ to the explanation assumed by Michaelson and Cohen.  To assume, as 
Michaelson and Cohen assume, that the infeliFLW\RIDWRNHQRI¶ shows that the content conveyed by an 
answering machine token of (1) is not cancellable extra-semantic content is to assume the first explanation 
is the right explanation.  But the classical account allows for an alternative explanation, so unless the 
                                                          
23
 The attempted cancellation of a conventional implicature DOVRUHVXOWVLQDQLQIHOLFLW\HJµVKHZDVSRRUEXWKDSS\QRWWR
VXJJHVWSRRUSHRSOHXVXDOO\DUHQ¶WKDSS\¶EXW0LFKDHOVRQDQG&RKHQULJKWO\GLVPLVVWKHVXJJHVWLRQWKDWWKHFRQWHQWFRQYH\HGby 
an answering machine message is a conventional implicature. 
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classical account has already been refuted this assumption µbeg[s] the question against the KaplanLDQYLHZ¶ 
(Akerman 2015, 473). 
(Akerman 2015) is a discussion of the VWDQGDUGµIHOLFLW\WHVW¶IRUFDQFHOODELOLW\.  In most cases, if 
the addition of a cancellation clause that contradicts conveyed content results in an infelicity, it can be 
concluded that the conveyed content is not cancellable, extra-semantic content.  But not in this case.  In this 
FDVH WKH LQIHOLFLW\ GRHVQ¶W VKRZ ZKDW DQ LQIHOLFLW\ QRUPDOO\ VKRZV EHFDXVH WKHUH DUH WZR DYDLODEOH
explanations of the infelicity, and the explanation according to which the conveyed content is not 
cancellable cannot be assumed to be the correct explanation.   
7KDW¶VDVIDUDVcNHUPDQJRHVcNHUPDQ±133) goes further and I will go further 
in the same vein.  The felicity test applied to a WRNHQRIGRHVQ¶Wshow that the content conveyed by the 
token is not cancellable.  But if neither H[SODQDWLRQRIWKHLQIHOLFLW\RIDWRNHQRI¶FDQEHUXOHGRXWthe 
WHVWDOVRGRHVQ¶W show that the content conveyed by the token is cancellable.  The test applied to a token of 
(1) helps neither the enemies nor the friends of the classical account.  However I will argue that the test 
applied to another token yields a decisive verdict, and the verdict in this case carries over to the case of an 
answering machine token of (1). 
   
      * 
 
The other token I will apply the test to is an answering machine token of (P). 
 
(P) I am not at home now. 
 
Consider, it LVWKHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIµQRZ¶LQDQVZHULQJPDFKLQHWRkens of (1) that is at issue.  Does the 
WRNHQRIµQRZ¶UHIHUWR7P, or is the proposition that is conveyed regarding TP cancellable, extra-semantic 
content?  7KHVDPHTXHVWLRQDULVHVIRUµQRZ¶LQDQDQVZHULQJPDFKLQHWRNHQRI3DQGEHFDXVHµQRZ¶LQ
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both tokens is interpreted the same way, the answer in the case of this token should carry over to the case 
of a token of (1). 
The only significant upshot ± given the purpose of determining this answer ± of replacing µKHUH¶
with a phrase which lacks the µspecial relationship¶WKDWµKHUH¶DQG µQRZ¶, according to the classical account, 
possess, is that WKHFODVVLFDODFFRXQWGRHVQ¶WWDNHDWRNHQRI3 WREHµORJLFDOO\IDOVH¶But this means that 
adding a clause that contradicts the content imparted by this token will either result in a coherent utterance 
± indicating that the imparted content is not the WRNHQ¶VVHPDQWLFFRQWHQW24 ± or result in a contradiction and 
so conclusively show that it is. 
 Imagine then an attempt to cancel the proposition concerning the whereabouts of the agent at TP 
that is imparted by an answering machine token of (P).  Imagine the agent is not at home when she makes 
the recording on her answering machine,PDJLQHVKHUHFRUGVDWRNHQRI3¶ in the answering machine 
shop LPDJLQHZH¶UHLQWKH0s and there are not only answering machines but answering machine shops 
where they can be bought) before bringing the device home.   
 
(P¶) ,DPQRWDWKRPHQRZ,¶PUHFRUGLQJWKLVLQWKHVKRS$QGZKHQWKLVLVSOD\HGEDFN,SUREDEO\
ZRQ¶WEHKRPHDOWKRXJK,PLJKWEHKRPHEXWMXVWQRWERWKHUHGWRSLFNXS 
 
A token of (P¶LV a bit baffling.  But after being initially baffled you will understand it as making a pedantic 
joke.  The pedant, you will surmise, recorded the message in the answering machine shop and left it on the 
machine as a joke.  Pedants, of course, insist on strict and literal truth.  If you would recognise a token of 
(P¶DVDSHGDQWLFMRNH\RXZRXOGWDNHLWWREe true.  You would understand the first clause to convey the 
                                                          
24
 ,WGRHVQ¶WVKRZWKDWWKHLPSDUWHGFRQWHQWLVDFRQYHUVDWLRQDOLPSOLFDWXUH&DQFHOODELOLW\LV only a necessary condition for 
conversational implicature. But I hold it safe to say that if the content imparted by the token of (P) was its semantic content, then 
a token of (P¶) would express but then gainsay that content and thus would fail to express a coherent proposition. I thus go 
beyond Åkerman (2017, 133) in taking the felicity of tokens like (P¶) to show that the imparted content of answering machine 
tokens of (1) is non-semantic. 
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pointless (even if accurate) information that the agent is not at home at TR, the pragmatically imparted 
content that she is not at home at TP having been cancelled.25 
 The crucial question is whether the bafflement or sense of inappropriateness provoked by a token 
RI3¶ is the sort of bafflement or sense of inappropriateness occasioned by an outright contradiction.  I 
suggest it is obviously not.  Rather it is precisely the sort of bafflement and sense of inappropriateness that 
is occasioned by the cancellation of a generalised conversational implicature.  Consider the attempted 
FDQFHOODWLRQRI%ORPH7LOOPDQ¶VH[DPSOHRID*&, 
 
(GCI*) ,¶PPHHWLQJDPDQIRUGLQQHUWRQLJKW,W¶VP\KXVEDQG 
 
As Blome Tillman puts it, while utterances of the likes of (GCI*) µPD\ VHHP VRPHZKDW RGG or 
conversationally misleading, they crucially do not express FRQWUDGLFWLRQV«¶Blome Tillman 2013, 182)  
This is precisely what I would say about a token of (P¶  %ORPH7LOOPDQ¶VH[DPSOHLVDQH[DPSOHRIMXVW
the same kind of pedantic joke that a token of (P¶FDQEHXVHGWRPDNH.      
The notion of generalised conversational implicature and examples of the phenomenon this notion 
tries to capture allow for a precise explanation of our intuitLRQVDERXWWRNHQVRI3¶ that allows that these 
are successful cases of cancellation.  That the content conveyed by answering machine tokens of (P) is 
cancellable non-semantic content shows that the same goes for the content conveyed by answering machine 
tokens of (1). 
       
4. Conclusion 
 
I have argued that answering machine messages and other alleged counterexamples to the classical account 
are no such thing.  The results of the test for whether the true content conveyed by answering machine 
                                                          
25
 Another pedantic answering machine message, which has the advantage of being recordable at home by the pedant, might go: 
µ,¶PKHUHQRZEXW,ZRQ¶WEHZKHQ\RXJHWWKLVPHVVDJH¶ 
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messages is semantic content or extra-semantic content corroborate WKHFODVVLFDODFFRXQW¶VLQVLVWHnce that 
it is extra-semantic content.  How is this content conveyed?  I have told a story that invokes a recognised 
mechanism for the conveyance of extra-semantic content.  The classical account, supplemented with this 
story, comfortably handles all examples of puzzling uses of indexicals and explains our intuitions, even our 
intuitions about puzzling locutions like (P¶,KDYHQ¶WFRQVLGHUHGall the examples, only a handful.  But I 
will ask you to consider any alleged counterexample to the classical account you can find in the literature 
or think of yourself and then ask yourself, is there an ad hoc game of make-believe of the sort being played 
in the survival expert case, or is there a type of make-believe conventionally associated with semantic 
tokens like the one in your example, that the audience could recognise in working out the content conveyed 
by the token?  For every alleged counterexample26, I submit, the answer is yes.  
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